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In this paper we put forward a model of basic research and long-run economic
growth in which the incentives of social reward to scienti￿c work may produce
increasing returns and multiple equilibria. The state organizes production of
new knowledge - a public good that improves ￿rms￿technology - with taxes
on the private sector. Scientists compete with one another to attain priority
over a discovery and be awarded both a real prize and prestige in the scienti￿c
community. Also, scientists derive job motivation from dedication to science
which provides social status. Analysis of the model shows, on the one hand,
a low equilibrium where the economy is endowed with a small science sector,
researchers have high relative income but low prestige, and competition for
discoveries is weak. On the other hand, there is a high equilibrium where the
economy has a large science sector, scientists obtain for new ￿ndings high
prestige but lower relative salaries and, as the e⁄ect of creative destruction
is strong, there is ￿erce competition among researchers. Comparative statics
shows that if the scienti￿c infrastructure is poor, policies that increase the
marginal bene￿ts from a discovery have perverse e⁄ects, while policies aimed
at improving the selection mechanism of researchers work well. The same
policies have opposite e⁄ects at the high steady state.
Jel codes: O31, Z10, H40, O401 Introduction
This paper analyzes the role of the incentive structure in science as a cause
of uneven economic growth and multiple equilibria. It develops a model of
economic growth which focuses on the organization of the scienti￿c com-
munity and explains the huge di⁄erence among developed and undeveloped
countries with respect to the productivity and the size of the science sector,
by focusing in particular on the role played by social rewards in this sector.
International data on size and productivity of science (e.g., Cole and
Phelan, 1999; Schofer, 2004) highlight large inequalities across countries, that
are even wider than economic inequalities. Table 1 shows the ratio between
active researchers and the population, the number of most cited articles per
researcher1 and the real GDP per capita for a sample of 88 countries in
1987. Descriptive statistics highlight striking inequalities across countries
with respect to both science and the economy. In fact, the huge distance
between maximum and minimum values of per capita GDP is even greater
in the case of the share of scientists in the population and also for their
productivity. This snapshot is con￿rmed by the coe¢ cient of variation since
the two indicators of science assume values double or triple the value of the
same statistic for GDP per capita.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics on GDP per capita and Science
indicators of 88 countries. Year 1987.
Min. Max. Average Coe⁄. of variation
Real GDP per capita, US $ 336 22300 6931.8 0.823
Science researchers 0.002 2.76 0.44 1.537
per million population
Highly cited articles per res. 0 80 5.21 2.437
Source: Penn World Tables; Cole and Phelan (1999).
The international distribution of research scientists and real GDP per
capita is further elucidated by ￿gures 1-3 which show the country distribu-
tion of the three variables. The comparison between scienti￿c and economic
indicators of development suggests that in the world economic inequality is
shaped by two clubs of countries with high and low per capita income, while
in the case of the scienti￿c infrastructure a large number of the low income
countries show quite trivial ￿gures that sharply contrast with those of a small
club with an important scienti￿c production.
1Data are from Cole and Phelan, 1999, who de￿ne active research scientists as ￿ any
individual who has recently published one or more papers in a journal included in the
Science Citation Index￿ , and most cited articles are de￿ned as articles with more than 40
citations.
1Another feature of this sector pointed out by empirical literature is the
presence of increasing returns. Cole and Phelan (1999), for example, ￿nd a
correlation of 0.86 between the number of research scientists per capita and
the average number of highly cited articles per scientist for 21 industrialized
countries in the year 1987. Figure 4 presents a plot of these variables that
con￿rms the positive relation between them. Recently, Aizenman and Noy
(2006) estimated a nonlinear model of the number of major prizes awarded
to researchers in ten countries with respect to population and real GDP in
the period 1901-2005, the latter being considered a proxy of the amount
of resources invested in research. The estimated relation increases at an
increasing rate if GDP exceeds a certain threshold. They interpret this result
as evidence for increasing returns in the science sector. Even more direct
con￿rmation of the presence of increasing returns in scienti￿c production at
country level comes from Carillo, Papagni and Capitanio (2006). This paper
contains an econometric analysis of articles per scientist in 4 ￿elds of seven
advanced countries in the period 1988-2001. Estimates con￿rm the ￿ndings
of Aizenman and Noy (2006) on the existence of increasing returns to scale
in all ￿elds analyzed if the science sector exceeds a threshold level.
The presence of increasing returns is able to explain the marked di⁄er-
ence between the size and the productivity of science sector of the various
countries. However, in the literature there is no a clear analysis of the mech-
anism which generates them. Our hypothesis is that increasing returns and
the inequality among countries in the science sector originate from the in-
stitution of open science (David, 1988) which is based on a sophisticated
self-reinforcing code of conduct. This code gives rise to a system of rewards
that assigns an important role to social rewards such as social prestige and
reputation among peers. We think that the way in which scientists acquire
reputation and social prestige is able to account for increasing returns and
international di⁄erences in scienti￿c infrastructures.
The organization of science and its norms of conduct have greatly charac-
terized the development of science in Western countries and can be considered
one of the main causes of their economic growth. This hypothesis is largely
supported by the literature on the economic history of developed countries.
In fact, several historians (Rosenberg and Birdzell,1986; 1990; Bekar and
Lipsey, 2001; and Mokyr, 2005) maintain that one of the most important
features that distinguishes the most industrialized countries from the rest
is their scienti￿c infrastructure. Mokyr (2005) argues extensively that the
economic miracle of the Western world can be ascribed in a signi￿cant part
to the a¢ rmation of science as an institution with an increased ability to
2investigate the secrets of nature2. This e¢ ciency is principally due to the
creation of institutions to host and remunerate scientists together with the
increasing specialization of research and the emergence of norms within the
scienti￿c community which regulate its activity3.
Sociological literature has investigated behavioral rules and norms that
prevail in the academic world (e.g., Merton, 1957; Ben-David, 1981; Stephan
and Levin, 1992). These were mainly analyzed by Merton (1957) and labelled
by Ziman (1994) with the acronym CUDOS. The ￿rst norm is communal-
ism, by which a researcher identi￿es with the community of scientists. The
second norm is universalism, by which the scienti￿c community is open to all
persons of competence regardless of their personal attributes. Two further
norms are disinterest and originality by which only the ￿rst discoverer of new
knowledge obtains a reward. This method of assignation of the reward makes
scienti￿c production a ￿ winner takes all￿contest and gives scientists power-
ful incentives to innovate because rewards invariably accrue to those who
discover things ￿rst (Merton, 1957; Dasgupta and David, 1994). The last
norm is scepticism, by which all contributors are subject to critical analysis.
By the interplay of all these norms a particular incentive structure de-
rives which has a multidimensional nature (David, 1988). This contains
both real rewards, such as wages, monetary prizes, etc., and non-real (or
social) rewards, such as social prestige, higher reputation among colleagues,
eponymy4, etc. More particularly, social reward takes two main forms ac-
cording to the source from which it derives: one is recognition in terms of
high prestige in the scienti￿c community that derives from important pub-
lications and innovations; the second is dedication to research that depends
on psychological characteristics of individuals and on cultural features.
The model shows a nonlinear relation between the bene￿ts deriving from
2The in￿ uence of scienti￿c advances on technological innovation and the productivity
of economic systems has also been the subject of applied literature for a number of years.
The studies by Mans￿eld (1991, 1995), which are based on surveys of ￿rms￿opinions,
show the importance of scienti￿c advances for innovation in products and processes, while
Adams (1990) estimates the contribution of scienti￿c knowledge to productivity growth in
18 manufacturing sectors. In his paper he ￿nds clear evidence for the relevance of scienti￿c
production by measuring it with publications in the scienti￿c ￿elds closest to the sector￿ s
technology from the 1930s.
3The nineteenth century also saw the birth of prestigious journals which collected and
disseminated the results of scienti￿c inquiry. Since then, peer reviewing of articles has
allowed objective quality assessment of the products of research and enabled scientists to
receive recognition from society in terms of income and prestige (Merton, 1957).
4This is the practice of a¢ xing the name of a scientist to all or part of what he/she has
discovered, as with the Copernican system etc. (Merton 1957). This is one of the greatest
forms of recognition since one￿ s name is immortalized by being attached to an idea.
3being a scientist and the size of the science sector that derives from the
interplay of two main dynamic forces with opposite sign: the positive one
is due to social prestige, positively linked to the size of basic research; the
negative one is due to the ￿priority rule￿and to the ￿creative destruction￿
e⁄ect. From such a nonlinear dynamic model a rich variety of equilibrium
outcomes derive. In particular, when the amount of resources invested in
research is low and social reward is high, two locally stable steady-states
emerge which seem to provide a suitable account of the nexus between science
and growth in low income countries and in the most industrialized economies.
The picture that emerges shows, on the one hand, an economy endowed
with a small science sector where researchers put a low level of e⁄ort into
research activity and competition for discoveries is weak; on the other hand,
an economy with a large science sector and rapid knowledge advancement.
In this ideal state of equilibrium, the scienti￿c community rewards members
who obtain new ￿ndings with high prestige and is characterized by ￿erce
competition among researchers.
Multiple equilibria emerge mainly because of the presence of social re-
wards. The low equilibrium seems to describe a kind of poverty trap because
both the productivity of scientists and growth rate are low and such equilib-
rium is selected when the science sector and, hence, the economy is at a low
level of development. Comparative static results allow us to further charac-
terize this equilibrium as a case of poverty trap since marginal increases in
real resources invested in research may have perverse e⁄ects on growth by
further reducing the scientists￿productivity. Only policies aimed at strength-
ening the social reward deriving from dedication to science, for example, by
improving the selection mechanism of the science sector, seem to work well.
At the high growth steady state, instead, policies that increase social and real
bene￿ts deriving from a new discovery have positive e⁄ects on the scientists￿
productivity, while strengthening the social reward given to scientists only
for their dedication to science may have perverse e⁄ects on the size of the
science sector.
A further result of great interest is that the equilibrium incentive struc-
ture depends on the type of equilibrium which prevails, since in the low
equilibrium scientists receive a salary which is high when compared with the
salary of other workers in the economy, but receive low international prestige,
while in the high equilibrium scientists, though highly productive, obtain a
lower relative salary but a higher international prestige. This result ￿nds
several, albeit indirect, empirical con￿rmations. Horsby, Martin and Wood-
burne (2005) show that in several countries (Australia, UK, Canada) there
is signi￿cant evidence for the relative decline in academic salaries. Stevens
(2004) ￿nds that academic salaries in the US and UK, two of the most pro-
4ductive countries in basic research, are lower than the salaries of comparable
skilled workers. Ong and Mitchell (2000), by comparing academic salaries
within a selected group of English-speaking countries,5 ￿nd that real aca-
demic salaries are higher in Hong Kong and Singapore than in the developed
countries. Our results may give a possible explanation for this empirical evid-
ence on relative salary of academics even if on this point further empirical
analysis is required.
Our paper relates to di⁄erent strands of literature. One is the Schumpet-
erian growth theory (e.g., Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman
and Helpman, 1991), which draws heavily on the microeconomic literature
on industrial innovation. More similar to our approach are models of ￿Gen-
eral Purpose Technology￿(Helpman, 1998) that deal with radical changes in
technologies that improve production possibilities in a wide range of sectors,
which should certainly be associated with advances occurring in the science
sector. However, none of these models investigate the sector of basic research
taking account of the organization of science that is implicitly assumed exo-
genous to the economy. In this regard, in the economic growth literature,
an exception is Karl Shell (1967, 1969), who proposes a theory of economic
growth in which basic research is endogenous. In this model, the state col-
lects resources from the activities of private agents in order to ￿nance basic
research, which produces knowledge, a public input to the private sector.
Shell investigates the dynamics of such a model economy, but he does not
deal with the reward system of the basic research sector as we do.
An important strand of the literature deals with the e⁄ects of social re-
ward on economic growth. Most of these studies (e. g., Cole, Mailath and
Postlewaite, 1992; Corneo and Jeanne, 2001; Cooper, Garcia-Penalosa and
Funk, 2001) investigate social status in terms of agent￿ s concern for relative
ranking in wealth and consumption. Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1992)
argue how such an enlargement of growth theory is able to produce multiple
equilibria. Fershtman, Murphy and Weiss (1996) apply this framework to
occupational status de￿ned as the comparison between the average human
capital of members of a group with respect to average human capital of mem-
bers of other groups. The present paper is complementary to this strand of
the literature since it recognizes the paramount role of social rewards in the
scienti￿c production (Fershtman, Murphy and Weiss, 1996; Howitt, 2000)
and investigates its implications for economic growth.
In spite of scant growth theory dealing with basic research, economists
(Arrow, 1962; Nelson 1959) have long concerned themselves with the world
5Gross salary data are for 1997 and the sample of countries includes Australia, Britain,
Canada, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa and US.
5of scienti￿c research. Indeed, the studies of the past two decades have given
rise to what has been termed the ￿ economics of science￿(see Stephan, 1996;
Dasgupta and David, 1987; 1994). Recently, a number of theoretical analyses
have shown the substantial di⁄erences between the activities of basic research
and those of technological innovation. Carraro and Siniscalco (2003) analyze
the race between public and private research units for a discovery with po-
tential economic application under the hypothesis of knowledge externalities.
Aghion, Dewatripont and Stein (2005) introduce creative freedom, a form of
non-real incentive, in a model of scienti￿c research. Comparing academic
and private ￿rm organizations - where research has an economic focus - they
show that relying on academic organizations in the early stages and on private
￿rms in later stages of research is socially optimal. Lazear (1997) investig-
ates award schemes in basic research contests with a model of overlapping
generations of heterogeneous agents and uncertain discoveries. He ￿nds that
less able researchers apply less e⁄ort than more able ones, and other results
concerning the e¢ ciency of various aspects of award schemes.
Dasgupta and David (1987; 1994) constructed a highly general theoret-
ical framework for the analysis of the production of basic knowledge. In this
framework, the state organizes the scienti￿c sector because the output from
scienti￿c research is considered to be a public good and because of the full
disclosure rule adopted by researchers when they obtain new results. The
￿ quest for priority￿produces a strong motivation in researchers and is a de-
cisive aspect of the theory imported from the sociology of science (Merton,
1957). Researchers compete against each other for rewards, which take the
form - in the case of success - of important publications and the consequent
advantages in terms of income, prestige and reputation. In our model we
build the microeconomics of science along such main lines, but we place it in
a general equilibrium model of economic growth by obtaining an explanation
for the broad di⁄erences in the science sector among di⁄erent countries.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we present the
model. In the third section we analyze the model￿ s equilibrium solution
and the implied economic dynamics. Some comparative-statics results are
discussed in section 4. Conclusions follow in section 5.
2 The model
2.1 Basic assumptions
In this section we present a model of endogenous growth that follows the
framework of neo-Schumpeterian models (Aghion-Howitt, 1992). The pro-
6duction side of the economy is made up by two sectors: science and consump-
tion goods production. There is no capital and the only inputs to production
are knowledge and workers.
In the model time is continuous and we distinguish calendar time, t, and
the state of knowledge that is indexed by k. The economy is populated by a
continuum of individuals, of measure 1, who can ￿nd employment in one of
the two sectors: lt;k work in a competitive sector that produces a consumption
good ct;k; while nt;k are employed in a basic research sector which produces
knowledge Rt;k used in the production of the ￿nal good. Manufacturing ￿rms
are owned by all agents in the economy, and labor and credit markets are
perfectly competitive. The state owns and organizes the science sector.
Each individual has an in￿nite life-span and we assume that every agent
derives utility from consumption, from social prestige and su⁄ers a loss of
utility from the e⁄ort applied to his/her job. Formally the instantaneous
utility function is given by:
ui;t;k = ct;k + Pi;t;k ￿ Di;t;k; (1)
where index i indicates where the agent works: i = S in the case of research
and i = y for good production; ct;k stands for consumption, Pi;t;k denotes
social prestige and Di;t;k is the disutility of e⁄ort.
The intertemporal preference rate, r > 0, is constant and in equilibrium
coincides with the rate of interest at which ￿rms collect savings.






with 0 < ￿ < 1 , where Rt;k is a technological parameter which measures
the productivity of the basic knowledge freely available in the technological
era k; and Z is an input available with ￿xed supply that in the following we
normalize to 1.
In this economy, innovation is made of new knowledge, Rk+1, that is
produced in the science sector and increases the productivity of ￿nal good
workers by a constant parameter ￿ > 1: That is to say, we assume that:
Rk = R0￿
k (3)
Consequently k denotes both the state of basic knowledge and the tech-
nological era that comes to an end with a scienti￿c discovery6.
6Since any variable that de￿nes the economy, and therefore the choices made by the
agents, remains constant during each technological era, henceforth we simplify the notation
by omitting the time index t when it is not indispensable.
72.2 The science sector
The science sector in this economy produces new basic knowledge which is a
public good freely available for the production of the ￿nal good. The research
￿rm is made up by one scientist. The occurrence of new basic knowledge is
uncertain and the probability of success for each agent follows a Poisson
distribution whose parameter depends on the e⁄ort of the researcher:
￿(xk) = ￿xk (4)
where xk is the e⁄ort and ￿ > 0 is a productivity parameter. We also assume
that discoveries are independent events across individuals and the aggregate
arrival rate is given by:
￿(nkxk) = ￿nkxk: (5)
2.2.1 The reward system of the science sector
The reward system is a distinguishing characteristic of the academic world.
This system rests on the high value attached by scientists to the priority
of discovery. As Robert Merton (1957) pointed out, science is an institution
which de￿nes originality as a ￿supreme value￿and makes recognition of one￿ s
originality a major concern. As a consequence of this norm, researchers
compete to be the ￿rst to produce a scienti￿c advancement and get a reward
from the scienti￿c community. In other words, the scienti￿c sector is a kind
of ￿winner takes all￿contest where the ￿rst to obtain the innovation gets the
whole prize. However, the rule of priority is not the only source of scientist￿ s
reward since the latter derives also from the simple running of the research
activity even if no innovation occurs.
Another important characteristic of the reward system in science is its
multidimensional nature: it usually consists of real reward, often funded by
the state, but also of social reward assigned by peers. In the following we
will deal with each speci￿c form of reward.
Social reward Many sociologists of science (Merton, 1973; Fox, 1983) have
pointed out that social reward is the most substantial part of scientists￿total
reward and is one of the main factors leading scientists to do research.
A reason that might explain the importance of such a system of scientists￿
reward may lie in the need to solve problems posed by externalities which
arise in research activity (Weiss and Fershtman, 1998). Indeed, given that
exclusion from the use of basic knowledge is not feasible, the rule of priority
can be an e¢ cient way to reward the producer of it with high social esteem
8which requires no direct transfer of resources. The scientist may enjoy this
social appreciation and be motivated by it even if he receives a lower salary
as a result.
The recognition that scientists obtain, however, is not public acclaim, but
rather recognition from their peers7 which usually takes the forms of citation
of their work, the respect of one￿ s colleagues, honori￿c awards, titles etc.8.
As noted by Coleman (1990), to establish one￿ s social status the opinion of
peers is far more valuable then those of other members of society, since it
rests principally on a consensus within a group. This is even more true in the
case of scientists, who consider the recognition of their peers highly valuable,
while underestimating the opinion of other social groups9.
The prime motive for which a scientist obtains recognition is for con-
tributing to the advancement of science as judged by experts in the ￿eld.
However, as Gaston (1978) has pointed out, scienti￿c races, unlike many
other races, do not award second and third prizes and assign recognition and
fame only to the ￿rst to make a discovery. As a result, scientists are obsessed
with establishing who has ￿ reached the pinnacle ￿rst￿ 10.
In order to capture these features of scientists￿social reward, we assume
that this in part is awarded only when a new ￿nd occurs. Such prestige is
an increasing function of the size of the research sector and the importance




where: 0 < ￿ < 1, P0 > 0 is a constant parameter, and Rk+1 here captures
the importance of the scienti￿c discovery. Hence, according to equation (6),
the prestige of a researcher increases as his scienti￿c community becomes
larger, but at a decreasing rate.
Although the professional prestige deriving from being an innovator is the
principal social reward for a scientist, it is not the only social reward. There
are in fact some cultural and psychological characteristics that are valued
for their own sake and are enough to keep many scientists working hard at
7Charles Darwin once said, ￿ My love of natural science....has been much aided by the
ambition to be esteemed by my fellow naturalists￿cit. in Merton, 1957).
8The greatest form of recognition is eponymy, the practice of one￿ s name being given to
one￿ s own discovery like Boyle￿ s law, the Copernican system, the Cobb-Douglas production
function.
9As a matter of fact, David Raup (1986) coined the phrase ￿ saganization￿to describe
the loss of professional reputation that scientists (such as Carl Sagan) su⁄er after receiving
continued mass media attention.
10Robert Merton (1957) amply showed how frequent and ￿ hard￿are disputes over pri-
ority in the history of science.
9their research. Among these there is ￿dedication to science￿ , which ￿nds
its ￿ raison d￿ etre￿in the rules which govern the institution of ￿ open science￿ ,
which include the idea that science is a mission to which one devotes oneself11.
The degree of a scientist￿ s dedication to science contributes to the form-
ation of his reputation, especially in contexts where scientists are a group of
highly motivated workers. Scientists who work in environments where there
is a strong ￿science ethos￿attach considerable social esteem to colleagues who
put a high level of e⁄ort into their job and devote themselves wholeheartedly
to the advancement of science12.
In order to consider this dimension of the social reward, which links psy-
chological attitudes and group norms, we hypothesize that devotion to science
interacts with the capacity to bear a high level of e⁄ort by reducing the dis-
utility deriving from it13. This reduction is not direct, but it happens only
if there is a gain in reputation, which occurs when a researcher employs a
higher than average level of e⁄ort.
Formally, the cost of e⁄ort will be:
D(xk;xk) = Rk [dxk ￿ s(xk ￿ xk)]
1+￿ (7)
with ￿ > 0 and (d￿s) > 014. Where xk is the average e⁄ort of the researchers￿
group, d and ￿ are two parameters which capture the disutility deriving from
e⁄ort, while parameter s denotes the reduction in cost deriving from status
e⁄ect.
Real reward In addition to social rewards, scientists ￿nd incentives from
real rewards too. These often consist of higher salary, monetary awards, roy-
alties, consulting and speaking fees, which can be considered as prizes for
11Some sociologists of science attribute this scientists￿behaviour to the presence of an
￿ inner compulsion￿ which exists even in the absence of external reward. Indeed, this
approach has been called the ￿ sacred spark￿theory (Cole and Cole, 1973). In a similar
vein, Mary Frank Fox (1983), a sociologist of science, notes that ￿ productive scientists,
and eminent scientists especially, are a strongly motivated group of researchers...and have
the stamina or the capacity to work hard and persist in the pursuit of long-range goals￿
(1983, p. 287).
12Crane (1965) reports that the social environment (college, department, etc.) is crucial
in determining norms, values, attitudes and style of work of scientists.
13This hypothesis is con￿rmed by empirical data on scientists (e.g. Cole and Cole,
1967), which suggests that in general they are highly absorbed, committed and strongly
identi￿ed with their work and are able to work hard and to persist in a line of research
even if the results are uncertain and long-term (see also Aghion, Dewatripoint and Stein,
2005).
14This assumption assures that social esteem is not so high as to make the utility function
convex (i.e. to make D(xk;xk) < 0):
10new ￿nds. There is substantial evidence that scientists￿income is related to
their productivity. Fulton and Trow (1974), for example, in their study of the
academic world in the 1970s concluded that publications ￿sharply enhance
scientists￿changes of high salary and earnings outside the universities￿ . Dia-
mond (1986), in his study on mathematicians employed at Berkley, found
salary to be positively related to productivity, while Tuckman (1976) found
the same relation between publications and ￿nancial awards for academic
engineering and physics.
Nevertheless, the scientist￿ s income also includes a component that is
not strictly related to success in research15. In order to capture these im-
portant characteristics of scientists￿incentive schemes, we assume that each
researcher receives a real prize mk+1 if he/she produces new knowledge and
a ￿xed salary Fk; just for entering the science sector.
Total reward To summarize the above arguments we argue that total
bene￿ts coming from a new ￿nd in each instant are given by the real reward
(mk+1) plus the social reward (Pk+1), both gained when new knowledge is
produced and therefore enjoyed in the period that follows k during which
research has been carried out. Moreover, we assume that both prizes will last
until new knowledge and a new technology appear on the scene. Formally,
the total expected rewards in terms of utility that derives from being awarded





￿[r+￿nk+1(xk+1)](t￿t0)(mk+1 + Pk+1)dt (8)
The agents￿utility function equation (1) implies that in every time period
consumption is ￿nanced by income. Hence, the expected intertemporal ￿ ow





￿[r+￿nkxk](t￿t0) [Vk+1 + Fk ￿ D(xk;xk)]dt =
Vk+1 + Fk ￿ D(xk;xk)
r + nk￿xk
(9)
2.3 The consumption good sector
In the consumption good sector there is no social prestige attached to this
type of work. To simplifythe algebra, we assume that the disutility of work
15Often this salary is connected with some other activity not directly linked to research
(for example teaching).
11is constant and normalize it to zero. Hence, workers in this sector derive









where wk is the wage net of taxes.
Workers in the consumption sector receive technology from academic re-
search at no cost, but they pay taxes on wages that the state uses to ￿nance
basic research. Considering the production function (2) and the hypothesis
of perfect competition, pro￿t maximization yields wages in the consumption
good sector given by:
wk = (1 ￿ ￿k)￿Rkl
￿￿1
k : (11)
where ￿k 2 (0;1) is the tax rate.
2.4 The public sector
To ￿nance production of knowledge by the research sector, the state levies
taxes on the consumption sector. To simplify the analysis, we assume that
wages of workers in the consumption good sector are taxed according to a
￿ at rate:
Tk = ￿k￿Yk, (12)
Our hypothesis on scientists￿real reward implies that the public expendit-
ure for the science sector is made of two components: the amount of real
income awarded only to those who win a scienti￿c discovery contest, and the
￿xed real income that does not depend on the outcome of scienti￿c races.
Hence, the state￿ s budget constraint is:
mk + Fknk = ￿k￿Yk. (13)
Given tax revenues, the state applies the following simple rule to assign these
resources to the two forms of real reward of scientists:
mk = ￿1￿Yk, (14)
Fk = ￿2￿Yk, (15)
with ￿1 2 (0;1) and ￿2 2 (0;1). Hence, ￿k = ￿1 + nk￿2; where ￿1 and nk￿2
represent the shares of private income that go to ￿nance respectively the
prize of scienti￿c races and the ￿xed salary of researchers.
123 Equilibrium dynamics of the model eco-
nomy
3.1 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in this model economy is de￿ned by both the optimal level of
e⁄ort that each scientist puts into the research activity and the optimal
number of scientists that are allocated to the science sector.
The optimal level of e⁄ort undertaken by scientists, xk, maximizes the
present value of the total expected bene￿ts deriving from doing research. We
assume that a scientist does not adopt a strategic behavior, such that he/she
does not consider the e⁄ect of his/her e⁄ort on the arrival rate of discoveries
in the economy. In this case, maximization of the total bene￿ts gives rise to
the following ￿rst order equilibrium condition:
￿(mk+1 + Pk+1)
r + nk+1￿xk+1
￿ (d ￿ s)(1 + ￿)Rk [dxkt ￿ s(xk ￿ xk)]
￿ = 0: (16)
According to equation (16), each researcher chooses the optimal value of
e⁄ort by equating the expected discounted marginal bene￿t of one more unit
of e⁄ort to the marginal disutility that derives from e⁄ort. The optimal
choice of e⁄ort depends on nk+1, the size of the science sector.
Since individuals can choose to participate in the labor market either as
workers in the consumption sector or as researchers in the science sector, in
equilibrium the maximum utility yielded by the two types of activity should
be the same. From equations (9) and (10) we have the following equilibrium
condition for the labor market:
Vk+1 + Fk ￿ Rk [dxkt ￿ s(xk ￿ xk)]
1+￿ = wk (17)
Given that individuals are homogeneous, equilibrium will be symmetric,
which implies that xk = xk: Finally, since the labor market is always in
equilibrium we have:
nk + lk = 1: (18)
3.2 Dynamics
The analysis of dynamic equilibrium derives from the last three conditions.
By solving this system we obtain the following implicit di⁄erence equation
in the variable nk:
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Equation (19) shows how equilibrium dynamics of the model can be rep-
resented by a di⁄erence equation in nk only. In fact, from equations (16),
(17) and (18) a monotone increasing function of scienti￿c e⁄ort with respect
to employment can be derived:





where xk assumes a positive value if D ￿ 0; which is the case if s < d￿
(1+￿), a
condition that hereafter we assume.
The two functions ￿(nk+1) and ￿(nk) can be considered respectively the
marginal bene￿ts and the marginal costs derived from being a scientist. The
shape of both functions depends on the peculiar structure of incentives that
we introduced, and in order to study the dynamics of the model, we need
complete characterization of both functions, that we summarize in the fol-
lowing lemma.
Lemma The function ￿(nk+1); de￿ned for nk+1 2 [0;1), assumes non-
negative values and is continuous. It is shaped like an inverted U with a
￿rst branch increasing and then decreasing. In the increasing branch, the









The function ￿(nk); de￿ned for n 2 [0;1), assumes positive values and
is continuous. It is monotone increasing and convex in nk; and takes limit
values:
lim







As might be expected, the peculiar structure of incentives in science
greatly a⁄ects the relation between bene￿ts and size of the research sec-
tor. In fact, marginal bene￿ts of research depend on the number of future
scientists substantially because of two e⁄ects with opposite sign. On the
one hand, an increasing number of future researchers reduces the real reward
obtainable from a new ￿nd and the period during which it lasts (creative-
destruction e⁄ect). On the other hand, an enlarged sector has the e⁄ect of
increasing prestige obtainable from a discovery (prestige e⁄ect). It can be
seen that, as n increases starting from low values, the prestige e⁄ect initially
dominates over creative destruction, making the curve ￿(nk+1) increasing.
Subsequently, the latter prevails over the former making the curve decreasing.
The function of marginal cost of research is always increasing in nk because
of the positive e⁄ect of nk on the workers￿wage in the consumption sector
which is the alternative sector.
From the proof of the lemma it can be veri￿ed that
@￿(nk)
@nk 6= 0. Hence,
we can apply the implicit function theorem to equation (19) and derive the
di⁄erence equation:
nk = ￿(nk+1): (21)
which summarizes the dynamics of equilibrium of the economy under the
assumption of perfect foresight16. In fact, we de￿ne a dynamic equilib-
rium with perfect foresight as an in￿nite sequence of scientists￿employment
fn0;n1;:nk:::g and scientists￿e⁄ort fx0;x1;::xk:::g that satisfy equations (19)
and (20).
From the lemma, it seems clear that equation (21) has an inverse U shape,
as ￿gure 5 shows. The di⁄erence equation can be characterized by one or two
rest points (￿gure 5), and it can intersect the 45￿ line both when the curve
is increasing and when it is decreasing. Of course, the two curves may not
intersect at all, and in this case equilibrium implies nil research and economic
growth.
Also, apart from stationary points, the di⁄erence equation (21) should
allow rich dynamics (e.g. cycles, see Grandmont, 1985; Medio and Raines,
2006). However, we restrict our investigation to steady states because they
represent equilibria that contain many of the interesting results of the model.
A steady state is de￿ned as the value of n such that n = ￿(n): Stability prop-
erties of such stationary points will be analyzed in terms of their local forward





@xk 6= 0 also holds, a similar di⁄erence equation in xk can be de￿ned:
xk = ￿x (xk+1).
15Proposition 1 The di⁄erence equation nk = ￿(nk+1) can have one or two





1+￿; then the system has one rest point n￿,
which is locally stable in the forward dynamics if it occurs in the decreasing
section of the ￿(n) curve and the condition ￿n(n￿) + ￿n(n￿) < 0 holds. In





1+￿, then the system has two rest points:
nl, nh. nl occurs in the increasing section of the ￿(n) curve and is locally
stable in the forward dynamics. nh is locally stable in the forward dynamics
if it occurs in the decreasing section of the ￿(n) curve and the condition
￿n(nh) + ￿n(nh) < 0 holds. While convergence to nl is monotone, that
towards nh is non-monotone.
3) The two rest points are characterized by the following relations: nh > nl
and xh > xl, where xh; xl stand for the values of e⁄ort implied by equation
(20) at steady states17.
Proof. In appendix.
In the ￿rst case of proposition 1 there is one stable equilibrium which oc-
curs when the growth potential of the science sector is completely exploited.
In fact, in this context, the steady state will be locally stable only if it occurs
when the relationship between nk+1 and nk becomes negative and, hence, it
occurs when the prestige e⁄ect, although it has contributed to the develop-
ment of the sector by raising the marginal bene￿ts in the ￿rst stages, becomes
so weak that it does not counterbalance the creative destruction e⁄ect. A
necessary condition for the emergence of this equilibrium is ￿(0) > ￿(0),
which is veri￿ed for high values of ￿1, ￿2: Hence, if real reward parameters
are high, it is more likely that only one equilibrium will emerge.
The second case, which seems the most interesting outcome of the model,
is characterized by the existence of multiple equilibria. A necessary condition
for the emergence of this case is ￿(0) < ￿(0), which is more likely to occur
when real rewards parameters ￿1, ￿2 are low and when the ￿ inner￿status
parameter s is high. Furthermore, this result derives not only from the above
condition, but also from the non-monotonic shape of the marginal bene￿ts
curve which derives from social prestige awarded by the scienti￿c community
to the winner of a race18.
Hence the ￿ rat race e⁄ect￿introduced in agents￿preferences may contrib-
ute to the emergence of two equilibria: equilibrium nl, characterized by low
17The monotone increasing relation between n and x implies that corresponding to the
stationary equilibria nl;nh there are two steady states xh, xl with the same stability
properties.
18This type of social prestige is captured by parameters P0 and ￿ .
16values of n and x; which occurs when marginal bene￿ts are increasing, hence
when the science sector has still unexploited growth potential; and equilib-
rium nh, with high values of both n and x;which occurs in the decreasing
section of the marginal bene￿ts curve, hence when the science sector has
completely exploited its growth potentiality. This latter rest point has the
same qualitative characteristics as the rest point that emerges in the case of
the unique equilibrium, hence we will refer below to both nh; xhand n￿; x￿
with the notation nh; xh. The two types of steady states (nh and nl) di⁄er











(1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ n￿2)
,
we see that it is a decreasing function of n. This implies that, at equilibrium
nl , the relative19 real income of scientists is high, while the social prestige
is comparatively low with respect to equilibrium nh. Hence the two types of
equilibria di⁄er in their incentive structure: when the science sector is small,
prestige plays a minor role in determining the amount of resources invested
in research, while when the science sector is well-developed, social prestige is
very important and real incentives play a less substantial role.
As regards reputation deriving from dedication to science, this is more
important in the low equilibrium since, given the low level of average e⁄ort,
it is less costly to obtain this kind of reputation.
In order to complete the characterization of the model at steady states
we have to focus on the growth rate of aggregate output. Of course, growth
proceeds over time according to a stochastic process with leaps in scienti￿c
and technological knowledge. At steady states the expected growth rate of
goods production may be derived as follows:
g ￿ E(lnYt ￿ lnYt￿1) = ln￿￿xn: (22)
According to equation (22), the growth rate depends positively on the number
of researchers and on their level of e⁄ort. Hence the two types of equilibria
can also be distinguished by the growth rate: low at (nl, xl) and high at (nh;
xh).
The low growth equilibrium (nl; xl) seems to describe a kind of low-
development trap characterized by a small research sector with growth poten-
tial not completely exploited. In this economy scientists have low productiv-
ity and receive a relatively high salary and have low international prestige. A
high share of the labor force is involved in goods production and there is scant
19In the sense that it is relative with respect to the wages of workers in goods production.
17investment in rapid knowledge advances. The opposite picture derives from
the model at the high stationary equilibrium. This describes an economy
with a large academic community, whose incentive structure shows high so-
cial prestige awarded to scientists for their discoveries and real incentives -
both mk and Fk - signi￿cant in absolute terms, albeit low in relative terms.
The science sector is very productive and can transfer with a fast pace new
knowledge to the sector of goods production which becomes very e¢ cient.
In this ideal state of equilibrium, creative destruction is strong, hence ￿erce
competition accelerates new discoveries and shortens the time during which
prizes are enjoyed.
4 Comparative Statics
In the previous section we underlined the di⁄erences in the two types of
steady state equilibria. Such di⁄erences look even greater in this section
where we analyze the reactions of endogenous variables to changes in prin-
cipal parameters at steady states.
Consistent with the previous discussion of steady states, we concentrate
￿rst on the case of low growth equilibrium. Comparative statics results are
summarized in the following:
Proposition 2 Let us consider the case where the stable stationary equilib-
rium occurs in the increasing section of the ￿(n) curve (nl;xl equilibrium);
1) positive changes in parameters P0, ￿; ￿1;and ￿2 have negative e⁄ects
on the number of researchers, on the level of e⁄ort and on the average growth
rate of real output;
2) positive changes in parameter s have positive e⁄ects on the number of
researchers, on the level of e⁄ort and on the average growth rate.
Proof. In appendix.
Proposition 2 seems to provide further support for the view of the low
growth steady state as a trap, since it shows that in this case even usual policy
instruments might fail. Indeed, both improving the science environment with
higher prestige awarded to innovative researchers (P0 and ￿) and increasing
their real rewards (￿1and ￿2) have negative e⁄ects on both dimensions of the
research sector: number of researchers and the level of e⁄ort. Inspection of
eq. (22), showing the average growth rate of output, reveals that at the low
steady state gl decreases with parameters P0;￿, ￿1;￿2 but increases with s.
These unusual e⁄ects can be explained by considering that at the low
stationary equilibrium the marginal bene￿t curve ￿(nk+1) slopes upward,
mainly because higher foreseen employment in science means higher prestige
18from a discovery. A marginal increase in parameters P0, ￿, ￿1, ￿2 shifts
the curve upward and the same value of marginal bene￿t at nl provides the
incentive for a smaller number of agents to enter the science sector. Hence
nk+1 < nl and the system moves toward a lower steady state.
An increase in parameter s has only positive e⁄ects on endogenous vari-
ables. This can be explained by the fact that at low n; the average level
of e⁄ort is low and a researcher could ￿nd it easier to employ a higher than
average level of e⁄ort. This could allow a scientist to attain high social status
by maintaining costs low at the same time. As a result, both an increase in
the number of scientists and in their level of e⁄ort may be obtained.
Quite interestingly, this last result maintains that if the science sector is
made up by people with higher ￿devotion to science￿ , then the economy will
succeed in enlarging the sector with researchers that will put higher e⁄ort
into their jobs. Such a policy will also increase the average growth rate of
output. In this respect, we might interpret an increase of the parameter
s as a policy that aims to improve the process of selection of scientists by
selecting agents with, on average, better psychological attitudes to the work
of research. Such a policy is on government agendas in many developing
countries.
A di⁄erent picture of comparative statics e⁄ects of parameter changes
derives from the model at steady state which occurs in the decreasing section
of the marginal bene￿ts curve. The results are summarized in the following:
Proposition 3 Let us consider comparative statics at high steady state (nh;xh).
Then:
1) positive changes in parameters Po and ￿ have positive e⁄ects on the
number of researchers, on their level of e⁄ort and on the average growth rate
of output;
2) positive changes in parameters ￿1and ￿2 have positive e⁄ects on the
number of researchers. When condition (2.a): nx >
￿r
￿(1￿￿); holds, changes in
￿2 have negative e⁄ects on e⁄ort, and when (2.a) and (2.b): (1￿￿) <
￿1
1￿￿2,
hold, also ￿1 causes a reduction in e⁄ort. In all these cases, the consequences
on the average growth rate are indeterminate;
3) positive changes in parameter s decrease the number of researchers
and if condition (2.a) holds, the e⁄ect on the level of e⁄ort is positive. The
consequences on the average growth rate are indeterminate.
Proof. In appendix.
Proposition 3 highlights the fact that changes in parameters P0 and ￿;
speci￿c to the social reward given to the innovator, have a positive impact
on both dimensions of the science sector: size and e⁄ort, while strengthening
19devotion to science reduces the number of people that may join this sector
even if it increases their commitment and hence their level of e⁄ort.
Di⁄erent outcomes derive from variations in real rewards parameters,
since their increase will raise the number of scientists, but will reduce the
level of e⁄ort that they sink in research activity. This is probably due to
a kind of income e⁄ect by which a higher income attracts more people to
that profession but reduces their working hours. The lower the parameter ￿;
which captures the gains in social prestige deriving from an innovation, the
more probable is this reduction. Hence the prestige reward may reduce the
perverse e⁄ects on scientist e⁄ort deriving from an increase in real reward.
Summing up, in the case of nh equilibrium, which may emerge both with
one equilibrium and with the multiple equilibria case, social reward deriving
from innovation strongly contributes to the development of the science sector.
Real incentives do not have the same e⁄ects since they may increase the
number of scientists but at a cost of reducing their e⁄ort. The social reward
deriving from dedication to science has the same ambiguous e⁄ect, with the
di⁄erence that rises in e⁄ort can be obtained at the cost of reducing the
number of scientists.
4.1 Simulation of the e⁄ects on the growth rate
As regards the average growth rate of output, from Proposition 3 we know
that it increases with parameters of prestige (P;￿) but nothing can be said
concerning the e⁄ects of ￿1;￿2;and s. An answer to the question of inde-
terminate sign of some comparative statics e⁄ects on gh can be obtained by
a simulation of the model, whose results are presented in table 220.
Table 2. Simulated e⁄ects of parameters ￿1;￿2;s on endogenous
variables at steady states.
20We performed model simulations by assuming the following values of parameters: ￿ =
0:15;￿ = 1:5;￿ = 0:7;￿ = 0:5;r = 0:1;s = 0:05;￿1 = 0:2;￿2 = 0:4;￿ = 0:4;d = 0:6;P =
2:4: In this case, the model produces two positive rest points that satisfy conditions for
local stability.
20nl xl gl nh xh gh
￿1 = 0:2 0.04 1.66 0.004 0.56 1.97 0.068
￿1 = 0:25 0.02 1.51 0.002 0.68 1.91 0.079
￿1 = 0:3 0.008 1.35 0.007 0.77 1.86 0.088
￿2 = 0:4 0.04 1.66 0.004 0.56 1.97 0.068
￿2 = 0:45 0.033 1.51 0.003 0.66 1.90 0.077
￿2 = 0:5 0.026 1.35 0.002 0.76 1.83 0.085
s = 0:05 0.04 1.66 0.004 0.56 1.97 0.068
s = 0:06 0.043 1.77 0.0046 0.52 2.05 0.064
s = 0:07 0.046 1.90 0.005 0.46 2.15 0.060
The above results show that at the high equilibrium the two tax rates
may have positive e⁄ects on growth, while that of the dedication parameter
s is negative. Accordingly, at high growth steady state policies aimed at in-
creasing bene￿ts deriving from research can contribute positively to economic
growth. This is not the case of policies targeted to improve the methods for
the selection of scientists since our simulation results indicate that higher
e⁄ort is not enough to compensate the shrinking of the scienti￿c community,
and a lower growth rate may result.
4.2 Comparison of theoretical results with stylized facts
What does the above analysis suggest? An overview of our results reveals
that the incentive structure of science has rather complex e⁄ects on the pro-
ductivity and size of this sector. Moreover, the e⁄ectiveness of the di⁄erent
types of rewards depends on the level of development already reached by the
sector. For example, social reward deriving from innovation is the only type
of reward that allows science to expand in both its dimensions: e⁄ort and size.
Nevertheless, it may cause multiple equilibria and hence the emergence of a
poverty trap equilibrium where it loses its expansive e⁄ects. Hence, even if it
may strongly contribute to the development of the sector without employing
a huge amount of real resources and allow the di¢ culty of monitoring e⁄ort
to be overcome, it may be one of the main causes of the sharp inequalities
existing in the science sector of the di⁄erent countries. Also, social reward
deriving from dedication to science has ambiguous e⁄ects: on the one hand,
it is the only e⁄ective tool for the expansion of science in the early stages
of its development; on the other, it is another cause of multiple equilibria
and hence of the emergence of the poverty trap. Finally, real incentives too
have ambiguous e⁄ects which again depend on the degree of development
21reached by the sector. In the high equilibrium they may increase the number
of researchers but at the cost of reducing their e⁄ort. In the low equilibrium
a marginal increase in them may even reduce the size of the sector, whereas
a marked increase in their number allows the low equilibrium to be avoided.
This di⁄ering e⁄ectiveness of rewards on the development of the science
sector is widely con￿rmed in the history of science and in the process of
institutionalization of modern academies.
According to some sociologists of science (Merton, 1957 and Box and
Cotgrove, 1966), scientists can be classi￿ed into three groups: a ￿rst group
of scientists for whom recognition from innovation is of major importance;
a second group of scientists who use their skills instrumentally as a means
of achieving non-scienti￿c rewards, and a third group which ￿..di⁄ers from
the ￿rst group of scientists only in that they do not attach importance to
publication but gained their satisfactions from practising science and from
recognition of colleagues￿(Cotgrove, 1970, p. 4). Box and Cotgrove (1966)
and Cotgrove (1970) ￿nd empirical evidence that the third group of scientists
is more present when the science sector is in the initial stage of its develop-
ment (￿ Little Science￿ , Cotgrove, 1970) and they argue that one result of
the growth of science is a change in both the kind of person who becomes a
scientist and in the role that he/she plays. Such evidence accords with our
theoretical results on the low steady state where dedication to work is an
important feature of scientists.
In well-developed academies people are attracted mainly by high prestige
and pay deriving from being an innovator, but they give less importance to
the status deriving from dedication to science21. Furthermore our results can
explain why in the last few years in the most developed countries there has
been a large increment in the number of scienti￿c awards22, and why this
proliferation especially concerns scienti￿c disciplines that are excluded from
the established prestigious scienti￿c awards and begins when they become
more important (Zuckerman, 1992). This picture is quite consistent with
the main features of the high steady state where social prestige that awards
innovations is highly e⁄ective for enlarging academy.
Another result of our model is the multiplicity of equilibria which seems
21Cotgrove (1970) has noted that ￿ Big science (i.e. a large science community ) o⁄ers
increasing incentives in the shape of pay, status and power. But it may no longer attract
mainly those who previously embraced the role of science as a source of personal emotional
grati￿cation. Moreover, the pleasure to be bought with higher incomes may seduce the
scientists from the monastic devotion to the pursuit of knowledge. (p. 9, 1970). (Italics
and phrases in parenthesis are ours).
22In North America there are 3000 scenti￿c awards, ￿ve times more than thirty years
ago (Zuckerman, 1992).
22to agree with evidence on the international distribution of science infrastruc-
tures that shows persistent and marked di⁄erences across countries (e.g.,
Schofer, 2004; Cole and Phelan, 1999), with a large club of countries with
a negligible science sector and a club to which belong very few countries
with a large science sector that produces most of the whole world￿ s scienti￿c
production.
The low equilibrium that we described may represent countries with some
degree of development, but a long way from the technological frontier. As
shown in Schofer (2004), several countries in Eastern Europe, Asia and South
America have small scienti￿c sectors with productivity far removed from
￿gures displayed by the USA and other industrialized countries. Data reveal
that in such economies, a minority of the population works in the academy,
and its marginal position in the international scienti￿c community brings
about low prestige. The creation of a scienti￿c sector often derives from
public policies aiming to reproduce the successful system of education and
science in Western countries (Drori, 1993). Such policies often entail that
scientists are compensated with high salaries. While high equilibrium seems
more suitable to represent economies which are close to the technological
frontier and have a well developed science sector (Schofer, 2004). The most
successful system of science, that of the USA, seems to ￿t with the high
steady-state (Ben-David, 1980).
The two equilibria may also explain the empirical evidence on the in-
creasing returns in the science sector. Cole and Phelan (1999), for example,
in their analysis of data on scienti￿c research of 95 countries in 1987, ￿nd a
positive relation between the number of scientists per capita and number of
highly cited articles per scientist23, that is a proxy for scienti￿c productiv-
ity. Also Aizman and Noy (2006) as well as Carillo, Papagni and Capitanio
(2006) ￿nd empirical evidence of increasing returns in the science sector after
the latter has reached a critical size.
Finally, as regards the di⁄erences in relative salaries of scientists in the
two equilibria, recent studies of international academic salaries (Horsley, Mar-
tin and Woodburne, 2005) provide evidence for declining salaries of univer-
sity researchers with respect to professionals for Australia, UK and Canada.
Also Stevens (2004) ￿nds that salaries of academics are lower than those
of comparable workers in the US and UK, while Ong and Mitchell (2000),
on comparing Commonwealth countries, ￿nd that Hong Kong and Singapore
have academic salaries that are higher than those observed in more developed
countries.
23The correlation index between the two variables is 0.55 for the whole sample and 0.86
for 24 industrialized countries.
235 Conclusions
In this paper we put forward a model of basic research and long-run economic
growth in which the system of incentives to scienti￿c work which heavily relies
on social rewards may produce positive feedbacks and increasing returns. We
provide a formalization of the interactions between the scienti￿c sector and
the rest of the economy which work both ways.
The organization of basic research presents both real and non-real in-
centives to workers. The state organizes production of new knowledge - a
public good that improves ￿rms￿technology - with resources taken from the
private sector. Scientists compete with one another to attain priority over
a discovery and be awarded both a real prize and prestige in the scienti￿c
community. Also, scientists derive job motivation from their search for status
in the community. The dynamic of the model economy shows that two loc-
ally stable stationary equilibria can derive. These equilibria may describe
two polar experiences in international economic growth. One is that of low
income countries in which science and technology institutions are not well
developed or competitive. The other steady state may be referred to the
most industrialized countries that are leaders in the search for scienti￿c ad-
vancement. Such sharp di⁄erences characterize equilibria with respect to the
e⁄ects of the incentive structure as well. At low development steady state,
incentives to marginally enhance real rewards and social prestige linked to
innovation have negative e⁄ects on growth, while public policy has to rely on
better selection of scientists with special dedication to research, the opposite
is true at the high steady state.
In this paper we help establish some of the main criteria for analyzing
an issue widely acknowledged as really important for long-run growth (e.g.,
Howitt, 2000). However, some crucial features of modern science still remain
unexplored. In our framework the transfer of new knowledge to ￿rms is
straightforward, but many empirical studies emphasize the complexity of
this transmission. Another issue that has recently come to the fore is the
increasing interest of the business sector in basic research and the reverse
increasing patenting activity of universities. Further research will address
analysis of these phenomena in the context of growth theory.
246 Appendix
Proof of the Lemma
By considering the ￿rst derivative of the marginal bene￿ts function with
respect to nk+1; we have:
@￿(nk+1)
@nk+1 R 0 () ￿P0n
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1+￿ [1 + ￿ ￿ nk+1￿(1 ￿ ￿)] R 0
This expression is composed of a positive term - the ￿rst, which is de-
creasing in nk+1 and for nk+1￿(0;1) assumes values from +1 to ￿Por - and
of three other terms, all negative, whose absolute values are increasing in
nk+1and tend to -1 for nk+1 = 1: This implies that for nk+1￿(0;1) the above
expression is ￿rst increasing and then decreasing with one stationary point.
To check the concavity of the increasing section of the marginal bene￿ts
function, we consider the sign of its second derivative with respect to nk+1:





























This expression is composed by three terms which are all negative. Also
the last term is negative in the increasing section of the marginal bene￿ts
curve. Hence, we are sure that in this section the second derivative assumes
negative values and the curve is concave.
The two limit values of the marginal bene￿ts function can be trivially
derived from an inspection of the marginal bene￿ts function.
To check the shape of the marginal costs function, we calculate its ￿rst
derivative with respect to nk;which is:
@￿(nk)
@nk
= (d ￿ s)d





25This expression is always positive. Thus the function is increasing in nk.
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which is always positive. Thus the marginal costs function is convex.
The two limit values of the marginal bene￿ts function can be trivially
derived from an inspection of the function.
Proof of Proposition 1





but ￿n (nk) > 0, hence:
d￿(nk+1)
dnk+1 ? 0 if ￿n(nk+1) ? 0. This means that as
nk+1 increases starting from zero, ￿(nk+1) is increasing and concave till it
reaches a maximum, then it is decreasing. It is easy to verify that ￿(nk+1)
crosses the horizontal axis at a positive value of nk+1 < 1. From the above
lemma we know that the di⁄erence equation nk = ￿(nk+1) has a graph that
intersects the vertical axis if ￿(0) > ￿(0); i.e. if
￿￿￿￿1
r




In this case, if the map intersects the 45￿ line at the decreasing branch and




￿ ￿ ￿ < 1; which
is a su¢ cient condition for the local stability in the forward dynamics of
the rest point n￿. The map ￿(nk+1) intersects the horizontal axis twice if
￿(0) > ￿(0), i.e. if
￿￿￿￿1
r




Given the shapes of marginal bene￿ts and cost functions, in this case there
can be either no intersection at all or two intersections, which identify the
two rest points, nl and nh with nl < nh. At the ￿rst stationary point nl
both ￿(nk+1) and ￿(nk) are increasing and ￿n(nl) > ￿n(nl) holds, hence
d￿￿1(n)
dn < 1; and nl is locally stable in the forward dynamics. The higher
steady state nh has the same properties as in case 1, and the same arguments
apply.
The last statement of the proposition derives from the monotone increas-
ing relation between x and n.
Proof of Proposition 2
26Let us de￿ne the implicit function which identi￿es the two steady state
equilibria: F (n) ￿ ￿(n)￿￿(n) = 0: By considering equation (19), this can













￿ (d ￿ s)(1 + ￿)d




















where z = ￿;P0;￿1;￿2;s: In the neighborhood of nl the denominator is posit-
ive because of the stability condition, hence @nl











@x ; this expression, as can be easily checked, is always
positive. Then, in an interval around the low equilibrium, an increase in these
parameters always has negative e⁄ects on the number of researchers.











r + ￿nl ￿

















￿￿1(1 ￿ nl)￿ + P0nl￿
￿nl ￿























d￿ [(1 + ￿)(d ￿ s) ￿ d]
:
This expression is always positive, hence @nl
@￿1 < 0:
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￿nl ￿























d￿ [(1 + ￿)(d ￿ s) ￿ d]
;
which is always positive, hence @nl
@￿2 < 0:
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￿￿(1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2)d2￿ (1 + ￿)








This expression is always negative, hence @nl
@s > 0:
As regards the e⁄ects on the level of e⁄ort, we derive with respect to
z = fP0;￿;￿1;￿2;sg the following expression:


















The sign of this expression depends on the sign of @nl
@z ; which, for the
parameters at hand, is negative.
For z = ￿1;￿2; @xl




1￿￿1￿￿2 R 0; given that for the
parameters at hand @nl
@z < 0; this expression is always negative.
For z = s; @xl




[(1+￿)(d￿s)￿d] R 0; which is always
positive.
Proof of Proposition 3
28This proposition concerns the comparative statics at the high equilibrium
and it also holds for the case of unique equilibrium since the same arguments





















where z = ￿;P0;￿1;￿2;s:













This implies that in the nh equilibrium, changes in the di⁄erent para-
meters have the opposite sign with respect to those in the low equilibrium.
Hence @nh
@z > 0 for z = fP0;￿;￿1;￿2;sg:
To ￿nd the e⁄ects of changes in the relevant parameters on the level of
e⁄ort, we rewrite the equilibrium condition as a function of e⁄ort. In this





























￿ (d ￿ s):












where z = ￿;P0;￿1;￿2;s:
Close to nh the denominator of the last equation is negative because of

































￿￿2; which is always positive.


























which is always positive.













￿ ￿(xh)x R 0:











which is satis￿ed if the following condition holds: nx >
￿r
￿(1￿￿):








R 0 () ￿￿x
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The last expression is negative if [(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿￿1] < 0; which













which is satis￿ed if the following condition holds: nx >
￿r
￿(1￿￿):
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